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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT WESTERN AUTO RADIATOR CO., INC.
TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

REPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
Western

Auto

Radiator

Co., Inc.

("Western")

hereby

replies to the petition for rehearing filed by Willard L.
Smith and Keith C. Smith ("Smiths").
("Opinion") was filed March

This Court's Opinion

16, 1988.

The petition for

rehearing was filed March 31, 1988.
RELIEF REQUESTED
This reply to the petition for rehearing asks this Court
to deny the petition, to affirm its Opinion without modification and to remand the case to the trial court for further

proceedings

consistent with

the

original Opiaion of this

Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WESTERN HAS MET ITS OBLIGATION TO DEMONSTRATE
THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE FINDINGS
Point I of Smiths' petition for rehearing is substantively indistinguishable from Point III of their Respondent's
Brief.

The cases cited by Smiths in Point I are either the

same cases or stand for the same propositions of law which
were previously submitted to this Court.
Western
decisions.

agrees

with

the

law as

set

forth

in those

Western does not agree with Smiths' suggestion

that "Judge Conder's Findings of Fact ... satisfy the finding
standard of Park v. Zions First National Bank, 673 P.2d 996
(Utah 1983)."

(Smiths Petition for Rehearing at 3.)

Neither the lower court's handwritten memorandum nor the
findings of fact prepared by Smiths' counsel and entered by
the Court set forth the basis on which Judge Conder reached
the judgment amounts.
Western is unable to "marshall all evidence in support
of the findings" for the simple reason that the judgment
appears to be incompatible with the evidence.
The only evidence submitted to the court below on the
issues of Smiths' uncompensated time were the affidavits of
Keith Smith and Willard Smith.

(A copy of the affidavit of
2

Willard Smith [R. 480-491] in the court below is annexed in
Addendum

A).

Willard L.
hour.

Reference

Smith

to

that

consistently

evidence

reflects

charged Western

that

$14.00 per

The time sheet examples for October 1985 attached to

his affidavit reflect various client account numbers of which
Western was apparently No. 48; the employee number of which
Willard

Smith was No. 1; the hours spent; and, the rate

charged.
Of the items shown on the employee time sheet, it is
undisputed that the majority of the items shown were billed
to Western and paid by Western in the regular course of
business.

(A copy of the October invoice and payment are

annexed in Addendum B ) .

The items claimed to be uncompen-

sated by Smith are identified by paper clips.

The entries

are as follows:
Acct.
No.
48

Emp.
No.
1

Hrs.
2

Rate

Other Services & Supplies

14.00

2 hrs. in Judge Condor's
Court

48
48

1
12

14.00

0

8.50

1

14.00

Time spent in depositions

1

48

1

48

1

48

1

Photocopy documents for
proof
required in lawsuit
Meeting with WW Bowerbank
onlawsuit conperns

1

14o00

Copying documents for WWB

1.75

14.00

Meeting with atty Cook on
our defense with lawsuit
3

Smiths requested $10,808.00 and $12,051.00 respectively
in their affidavits for 270.50 hours and 200.85 hours of
"uncompensated" time at a claimed rate of $40.00 to $60.00
per hour.
$14.00

As is apparent, Western had been paying Smiths

per

hour

for

their

time.

It

is

mathematically

impossible to arrive at the judgment amounts by reference to
any evidence in the record.
The findings of fact were prepared by Smiths' counsel
based upon the lower court's memorandum.

Paragraph 11 reads:

"The professional time of defendant Director Willard
L. Smith necessarily, fairly and reasonably expended
in connection with this litigation in good faith which
should be assessed against Western Auto Radiator, Inc.
has a reasonable value of $5,514.60"
The dollar figure simply does not exist elsewhere in the
record of this case.
The same analysis may be applied to paragraphs 12 and 15
of the findings of fact entered by the Court.

Although one

may speculate that Judge Conder awarded Smiths' attorney's
fees for all of the time submitted at the rate of $75.00 per
hour, as Western pointed out in its original brief (page 14),
there

is

no

evidence

in

the

record

to

support

that

speculation.
Western is unable to understand the factual basis of
Judge Conder's ruling and judgment, and there are no facts in
the record which are "clear, uncontroverted and capable of
supporting

only

a

finding

in

favor

of

the

judgment."

Kinkella v. Bauah, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983); Acton v.
4

Deliran. 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987).
Smiths' petition for rehearing does not cite any facts
in the record which support the dollar figures Judge Conder
awarded and Western is unable to refer this Court to any as
required by Rule 24(a)(7), R. Utah Ct. App.

Trees v. Lewis,

738 P.2d 612 (Utah 1987).
Smiths argue that it is unduly burdensome to require
trial courts "to make the kind of comprehensive, detailed
findings of fact in all cases suggested by the Memorandum
Decision•"

Smiths suggest that such a burden should only "be

established by the Supreme Court."

Western believes that

Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court
and that the Supreme Court has ruled upon the requirement
that

a

trial

court

findings

should

contain

sufficient

subsidiary facts to disclose how the trial court reached its
ultimate

factual

conclusions.

See Park

v.

Zions

First

National Bank, supra; Acton v. Deliran, supra; Kinkella v.
Baugh, supra; Gaddis Investment Co. v. Morrison, 278 P.2d
284, 285 (Utah 1954).
Western believes that this Court did not misapprehend
the facts reflected in the record of this case.

Willard

Smith's handwritten time sheet reflects $14.00 per hour.
so-called

The

explanation used by counsel for Smiths in oral

argument and recited by this Court on page 4 of the Opinion
that the Smiths charged a different rate "for their own, more
valuable services" is contradicted by Willard Smith's hand5

written time sheet.
Similarly,

Western

believes

that

this

Court

has

correctly ruled on the legal issues presented and there is no
legal reason why this matter should be reheard by the Utah
Court of Appeals.

The fact that Judge Conder has retired

makes no difference.
the

trial

judge

In the case of Acton v. Deliran, supra,

had retired

and the Utah

Supreme Court

required that the matter be retried by his successor.
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT COMPEL WESTERN TO
MAINTAIN THE SUBSTITUTE SUPERSEDEAS PENDING
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
Smiths apparently want to have this Court order what
amounts to a prejudgment writ of attachment to secure the
payment of some undetermined amount which the trial court
finds due and owing.
"A losing party cannot use a petition for rehearing 'to
present to this court a new theory or contention which was
neither in the record as it was before this court nor in the
arguments made,' Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah 485, 498, 170 P.
774, 778 (1918).

Rehearing is denied."

Lockhart Co. v.

Anderson, 646 P.2d 678, 681 (Utah 1982).
The

stipulation

for

deposit

in

lieu

of

supersedeas

should be treated in the same manner as if Western had posted
a supersedeas bond.
Clearly, had the Utah Court of Appeals simply reversed
the judgment, the liability of a surety on a bond would be
6

discharged.

Also, had the Court directed the trial court to

enter judgment for a sum certain less than the entire amount,
the surety would be liable for that sum.

However, if, as

here, the Court vacates the judgment and remands with a
direction

for the court below to

surety would be discharged.

exercise discretion, a

Harp v. American Surety Company

of New York, 311 P.2d 988, 990 (Wash. 1957).
In the instant case, the cash deposited by Western in
lieu of a supersedeas bond should be returned to Western.
There simply is no legal basis for Smiths' request.
Smiths speculate in their petition for rehearing that Western
may suffer business failure and be unable to pay any judgment
the Smiths may obtain.
Western has been in business continuously since 1917.
(To 10)

Western entered into the supersedeas for the reason

that Smiths, without notice, had garnished the entire amount
of their judgment from Western's bank accounts while this
appeal was pending.

Western does not argue that Smiths did

anything unlawful but simply points to the fact that the
Smiths were able to collect the entire judgment from readily
available corporate cash reserves.
Since March 16, 1988, Western has allowed Willard Smith
access to its books to satisfy himself of the corporate
condition

(which

undertaken.)

is

better

than

when

this

appeal

was

Western has attempted at all times to settle

this dispute both during the pendency of the appeal and
7

subsequent to the entry of the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals without success.
Western is currently earning in excess of 9% interest on
its demand deposits and the certificate of deposit referred
to in the substitute supersedeas is earning less interest
than any of Western's demand deposits, except its ordinary
checking account which has a minimal balance.
POINT III
THE JUDGMENT MUST BE VACATED
Smiths argue that even if the case must be remanded and
the issues of indemnity retried, the judgment should not be
vacated.

Smiths do not cite a single case in support of this

argument.
Smiths are quite simply wrong.

The Utah case law is

quite literally beyond question that when a judgment is not
supported by adequate findings of fact or evidence, it must
be vacated.

Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P.; Romrell v. Zions First

National Bank N.A., 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980); Kinkella v.
Baucrh, supra: Smith v. Smith, 726 P. 2d 423

(Utah

1986);

Anderson v. Utah County Board of County Commissioners, 589
P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979); Acton v. Deliran, supra.
In this case, as has already been detailed, the findings
of fact do not state the basis of the judgment with sufficient facts to allow one to determine the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion was reached.
1336

(Utah

1979).

Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d

Therefore, the
8

judgment was properly

vacated.
Western believes that the Utah Court of Appeals has
correctly applied the law to the facts of this case and there
is no reason to rehear or modify its decision in this case.
POINT IV
SMITHS SHOULD NOT BE INDEMNIFIED FOR
IN-THE-COURTROOM TIME SPENT SITTING
Smiths' fourth point in their petition for rehearing is
that Smiths are entitled to be compensated for all of their
"litigation

consumed

Rehearing at 10) •

professional

time"

(Petition

for

The Court of Appeals has already con-

sidered this point, which was Point III in Smiths' original
brief (Respondent's Brief at 30) and which was rejected in
this Court's Opinion, page 3.
Smiths fail to cite any authority for the proposition
that a litigant's time is a recoverable expense under Utah
Code Ann., § 16-10-4(o)(3) (1953) [Addendum C ] .

They argue

that there is no reason to require Smiths to divide what time
was

spent

by

them

in

the

capacity

of

Certified

Public

Accountants and what time was spent by them on activities
which any named defendant encounters such as sitting around
the courthouse awaiting developments.

The Smiths' motivation

for making this argument is not as clear from the record as
it could beQ
Western believes the evidence reveals that Smiths have
already been paid for their professional time through regular
invoices submitted to Western during the underlying litiga9

tion.

At trial, Smiths and defendants Bowerbank introduced

the corporate profit

and

loss statements which reflected

substantial accounting expenses paid to Smiths over the years
and continuing even through the litigation. (Trial Exhibits
D-54 through D-65).
It is undisputed that Western has dutifully paid upon
receipt all invoices submitted by Smiths for professional
services rendered. (See e.g. Addendum B ) .
What Smiths are seeking is that they be paid for their
time spent sitting around the courthouse. They want to be
paid what other accountants

charge, $40.00 to $60.00 per

hour, not the $14.00 per hour Smiths themselves charge.

Time

so spent is not an expense contemplated by Utah Code Ann.,. §
16-10-(2)(c) (1987 Supp.)

An expense incurred in litigation

as

statute

contemplated

by

the

is

meant

to

reimburse

directors for their out-of-pocket expenses not to compensate
them for their time and not to allow them a windfall or to
profit from being sued.

See Curtis & Gartside Co. v. Aetna

Life Ins. Co., 160 P 465
Mercury

Indemnity

Co.,

(Okla. 1916); U.S. v. St. Paul

238

F.2d

594

(8th

Cir.

1956);

Commercial National Bank in Shreveport v. Parsons, 144 F.2d
231

(5th Cir. 1944); Almarez v. Carpenter, 477 P.2d

792

(Colo. 1970).
While Smiths have protested vigorously that they were
without blame and innocent participants, it should not go
unmentioned that the precipitating cause of the shareholder
10

frustration in this case was the over issuance of more than
150,000 shares of Western's stock by Willard Smith.

This

admitted error is totally ignored in Smiths' petition for
rehearing.
POINT V
SMITHS SHOULD NOT BE INDEMNIFIED AGAINST
ALL ATTORNEYS FEES
The

Opinion

correctly

states

that

the

statutory

provision for indemnification of attorney's fees found in
Utah Code Ann. , § 16-10-4(o) (3) (1953) is limited to fees
incurred

"in

connection"

with

defending

the

derivative

action.
The

pretrial

order

specifically

sets

forth

that

plaintiffs in the action below claimed a derivative action
against defendant William W. Bowerbank only.
at 5,

R. 235).

(Pretrial Order

The relief sought was to have a real estate

contract between W. W. Bowerbank rescinded or reformed (R.
249# 250); should Jonathan Bowerbank be required to pay for
repairs on his car (R. 250); should Jonathan Bowerbank repay
Western for his health insurance (R. 250); should there be an
adjustment

to

the

amortization

schedule

between

W.

W.

Bowerbank and plaintiffs below (R. 251); is the consulting
agreement between W. W. Bowerbank and Western enforceable (R*
251);

and,

are

plaintiffs

entitled

to

a

court

ordered

accounting (R. 251).
The only conceivable basis for Smiths' claim that they
were required to vigorously defend is found in paragraph 3(e)
11

of the pretrial order (R. 238) which states:
"(e) Plaintiffs hereby abandon the remaining claims
contained in their second cause of action . • . for
the reason that the remaining claims have been
resolved to plaintiffs' satisfaction with the
exception of the propriety of the director's fees
which plaintiffs claim was unearned by reason of
their acting on behalf of William W. Bowerbank."
The* arguments of Smiths' petition for rehearing are to a
large degree simply a restatement of the position they took
in their original brief on appeal.

Smiths consistently fail

to recognize that Utah law has never allowed the recovery of
attorney's

fees unless

basis exists.

either

a contractual or statutory

See Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 598

P.2d 346 (Utah 1979); Dyson v. Aviation Office of America,
Inc., 593 P.2d 143 (Utah 1979).
Our Supreme Court addressed a problem similar to this
case in Utah Farm Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627
P.2d 62 (Utah 1981).

In the Cox case, the plaintiff filed an

action to foreclose a loan and the defendant counterclaimed
for breach
clearly

of a verbal

attorney's

fees

loan commitment.
are

recoverable

In that case,
only

plaintiff's foreclosure action and not defense.

for

the

The Supreme

Court held that plaintiff was entitled only to an award of
fees for their principal cause of action and not for defense
of the counterclaim.
In affirming the refusal of the trial court to award
attorney's

fees,

Justice

Hall

stated,

"Because

plaintiff

failed in its proof, the court was left without a means to
12

determine

the

portion

of

plaintiff's

fees

spent

in

prosecuting its complaint and the portion spent in defending
the counterclaim,"

(Emphasis supplied by the court). Id at

66.
Smiths' claim

appears to be that

once a derivative

action was originally filed, they were thereafter entitled to
all of their attorney's fees regardless of the reason for the
fee.

That position is simply contrary to the holdings of our

Supreme Court in the cases cited above.
POINT VI
SMITHS' ENTITLEMENT TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ON
APPEAL SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF
THE TRIAL COURT ON REMAND
Smiths' argument in Point VI is that the Utah Court of
Appeals

overlooked

"Point

V

of

Smiths'

appeal

brief."

(Petition for Rehearing at 13).
The only Utah case on this point which Western has been
able to find is the case of Pioneer Finance & Thrift Co. v.
Powell,

that

case, the

plaintiff's judgment was affirmed and plaintiff

sought to

have the

443

P.2d

389

(Utah

Supreme Court

1968).

In

"assess attorney's

fees

for this

appeal under the provisions of the note and mortgage."
Supreme

Court

responded

"This

court

does

not

The

receive

evidence, and this phase of plaintiff's contention will have
to be determined elsewhere."

Id. at 391.

While it is presumed by Western that the fact that the
Court of Appeals provided that "the parties shall bear their
13

own costs of this appeal" may have some impact on the trial
court, nothing in the Opinion precludes the trial court from
awarding such attorney's fees as may be appropriate for trial
or appeal•

And

the Court's reference to footnote 5 in

Halladay v. Cluff, 739 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
clearly indicates this Court's view that the trial court is
in

a

better

position

to

take

evidence

and

evaluate

a

particular case from a factual perspective.
Western has argued, and will continue to argue, that the
bulk of Smiths' attorney's fees were incurred defending the
indefensible, to wit:

That a litigant's time spent "sitting

around the courthouse awaiting developments" is an expense
subject to indemnity.
POINT VII
WESTERN IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS FOR THE NECESSITY OF
RESPONDING TO SMITHS' PETITION FOR REHEARING
The only citation to authority found in Smiths' petition
for rehearing is found in Point I.

The legal premise set

forth therein is absolutely clear and Western is confident
that the Utah Court of Appeals did not misapprehend the law
on that subject.
Smiths have likewise failed to suggest any fact which
the Court of Appeals overlooked in its Opinion.

Rule 35(a),

R. Utah Ct. App., requires that "the petitioner state with
particularity the points of law or fact which the petitioner
claims the Court has overlooked or misapprehended." (emphasis
14

supplied)
The

only

thing

new

presented

by

the

petition

for

rehearing is the request made in Point II that "The Court
should direct that the substitute supersedeas bond arrangement stipulated by the parties remain in effect pending final
disposition of this matter•"
Western maintains that Smiths' petition for rehearing
argues the same issues, law and facts which have previously
been submitted, considered and rejected by this Court.

Thus,

pursuant to either Rule 33, R. Utah Ct. App., regarding
frivolous motions, or Rule 40, R. Utah Ct. App., regarding
good faith requirements not to needlessly increase the cost
of litigation, Western requests that this Court award its
costs and attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
Smiths' petition for rehearing should be denied and this
Court's Opinion should be affirmed without modification.
DATED this

^

1^

day of April, 1988.
Respectfully submitted,

James R. Mclntyre
McI^TJRE & DENNIS, P»C.
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned
(4) true and

correct

certifies that on the date below four
copies of REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

WESTERN AUTO RADIATOR CO., INC. were mailed to David S. Cook,
85

West

400

North,
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Utah

84010, Attorney

for

Respondents.
DATED this

A/ "

day of April, 1988.
McINTYRE & DENNIS, P.C.

JAMES/A/. McINTYRE, A t t o r n ^
Def^SJ^ant and A p p e l l a n t
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ADDENDUM A

AVID S. COOK #0715
ttorney for Defendants Smith
5 West 400 North
ountiful, Utah 84010
el: 292-7216

j
—

—

'

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LAINE GOODRICH, DAVID IIOYT,
AL KIDMAN, STERLING JONES
nd DANIEL WEYMAN,
Plaintiffs,
s.
ESTERN AUTO RADIATOR CO.,
N C , a Utah corporation,
nd WILLIAM W. BOWERBANK,
ILLARD L. SMITH, JONATHAN
OWERBANK, KIM BOWERBANK
nd KEITH C. SMITH,

AFFIDAVIT OF WILLARD L. SMITH
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
DETERMINATION OF INDEMNIFICATION
AND RELATED ISSUES,
Civil No. C84-924
(Judge Dean E. Conder)

Defendants.
,TATE OF UTAH

)

lOUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

!SS

Willard L. Smith, being first duly sworn on oath deposes
md says;
1.

Affiant is one of the above named Defendants, has

>ersonal knowledge of the matters hereinafter set forth and makes
;his affidavit in support of the motion for determination of indemnification and related issues submitted herewith.
2.

At the request of counsel for Plaintiffs, relayed

to Affiant through Affiant's counsel David S. Cook, Affiant rereviewed correspondence, time sheets, documents prepared in connects
with the litigation, calendar notes and memoranda and from said
sources prepared and submitted to counsel for Plaintiffs and counsel
for Defendants Bowcrbank the annexed schedule of hours attached
hereto marked Exhibit "1" which said schedule of time summarizes cer
time Affiant has expended which has actually been billed to and paid
by Defendant Western Auto Radiator Co a , Inc. and additional unbilled
time necessarily expended by Affiant in connection with these proceei
3.

Attached to said Exhibit "1" is a sample of an employee

time sheet showing the kind and nature of part of the documents
from which said time summary Exhibit "1" was prepared.
4.

Affiant is a CPA and in Affiantfs professional opinion,

the time and services reflected on Exhibit

,f M

l were necessarily ex-

pended and were of benefit to the other parties to this litigation,
5*

In Affiant's professional opinion and based on his know-

ledge of rates customarily charged by other CPAs in the practice in
the Salt Lake City area, the sum of $60 per hour is a modest fair ra
for the time and services Affiant has expended in connection with
the subject litigation,,
6.

Affiant has necessarily expended a total of 200-85 un-

compensated hours, not including additional time which was not
recorded for which Affiant will remain uncompensated, for which
Affiant seeks reimbursement in the total sum of $12,051.00.

-2-

DATED this

// day of February, 1986

WILLARD L. SMITH
Subscribed and sworn/to before me this //v

day of

February, 1986.
NOTARY fo'
My Commission Expires

Residing at; 7^S^^-^^L/

T

/Vv^

^W,///^
/

Served the foregoing affidavit by mailing copies
thereof to Michael S. Heyrend and Thomas P. Melloy, Attorneys for
William Bowerbank, Twelfth Floor, 310 South Main Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101-2171, Bert Dart ,v Attorney for Western Auto
Radiator Co., 310 South Main St., Salt Lake City, Utah, and James
Mclntyre, Attorney for Plaintiffs, P.O. Box 7280, Salt Lake City,
UT. this |(

day of February, 1986.

ADDENDUM B

WILLARD L. SMITH, CPA
Schedule of hours for the lawsuit
of Western Auto Radiator Company
January 16 1986

U.S

1984
March 5

March 6

March 16

March 7,15,28

March 25

April 4

May 31

Aug. 14, 15

Spnt

in

Oct. 2,3

Meeting with Attorney Cook with regards to court summons
served us at 7:27 PM February 29, 1984 to solicit his
services and go over the issues detailed in the summons
and the attached complaint.

Ivo
3 hours

Another meeting with Attorney Cook to go over contracts
and issues listed in the complaint and to leave copies
of documents and other detail.

IA/&
4 hours

Conference with Mr. Cook to go over issues and to make
us aware of evidence needed for pre-trial issues and a
Stock Clarification Schedule. See letter dated 3-17-84

\/vo
1J hours

Go over Common Stock Contract, Preferred Stock Contract,
and building contract, and prepare schedule to discuss
and work with CPA firm Leverich & Co., representing
Mclntyre's office. (Other staff
time of 2 hour± not
included.)

i*
if*
6 hours

Prepare Schedule of Preferred Stock issued. Schedule
dated March 26, 1984 and the correct amount of shares,
and the proposed corrections for Attorneys Cook, Vogel,
and Mclntyre. (Preparation time 3 hours). (See Watkiss
and Campbell request letter 3/6/84).

5 hours

Search out information requested by attorneys O O J L J A L —
Bowerb.afl.ks Income Tax Schedule D for evidence on the
amount reported by him for Sale of, Stock. (Our letter
dated 4/4/84).
*

U^
1 hour

Conference with Mr. Cook on stock issues which are still
unclear and what will be needed from us as we proceed in
this case.

^^
2 hours

Time to solve preferred stock problem and reconcile
Mr. Mclntyre's number of shares 171,712 to the amount
which should have been issued.
(See schedule and letter
dated 8/24/84).

^
5£ hour

Time spent with Mr. Cook in going over the issues
presented by the amended complaint dated August 20, 1984
and details needed to prepare our material for answering
the same. Mr. Cook gave us a list of items to work out.

1/vO
2 hour!

Work with Mr. Cook in getting ready for the trial which
has been set 10-9-85. Going over the evidence and
answering the questions which may be posed in the case.
Time also to work out answers for counter-claims and
cross claims dated 10/5/84.
Conference with purchasers and Mr. Mclntyre on buildiftg
purchase and other issues
Exhibit " 1 "

J ^
C

\MYS-

IA/0.

6 hduf

V
1J hou

1984
Dec. 4

Dec. 26, 27

Studied the affidavit of Val Kidman dated 3rd day of
December and their implications. Time used to work out
evidence with regards to these allegations. Discussed
this with Mr. Cook.

2 2 hours

Time spent with Mr. Cook and preparing for depositions
on this lawsuit and checking our information available
for proof.

l^
3 hours

Time at Mclntyre's office for depositions for W. Bowerbank,
Willard Smith and Keith Smith.

Ys/O
6 hours

Work on copying for evidence all corporate tax returns
for Western Auto Radiator Co. back to first return filed
for the year 1966.

I^O
4 hours

Time going back over preferred stock payments, looking
up each check and listing each check number and exact
date of payment and preparing copies for attorneys.

^
3j> hours

[A^

l

1985
Feb. 14
April
-^^

Prepare schedules for each stock purchaser listing the
number of incorrect shares, cost price, correct shares,
and their cost prices with accompanying notes to direct
the correction. See schedules.

4 hours

Time in attending Blaine Goodrich's deposition.

6 hours

Time in responding tu query by Michael Heyrend on
stock issue. See letter and schedules as of this date.

lA/O
5 hours

Oct. 30

Conference with Bert Dart on stock issues and the
proposed remedies.

uP-4
1 hour

Oct. 30

Conference with Attorney Cook on our defense in lawsuit.

1J hours

Nov, 22

Letter from Mr. Cook telling us to prepare for trial and
obtain any evidence we do not already have to cover items
in second amended complaint. Time spent to go back over
items already produced and obtain additions as requested
and also to study items 41 to 59 in second complaint
issued by James Mclntyre.

7 hours

Nov. 7

Conference with Mr. Cook to go over evidence.

6 hours

November 8

Conference with Mr. Cook on trial items.

2£ hours

Dec,

Conference with Mr. Cook, Heyrend, Maloy, Dart, and
Shaffer on pre trial items and to learn of items still
needed for proof.

VJO,
3 houf~3

June 5
Aug.
N(^

yjO

1AX>

page 3

1985
Conference with attorney on additional items necessary
for trial on December 10 and work on items needed for
proof.

6 hours

Preparation for trial taking material for trial and
placing in boxes to be transported to court.

6 hours

Dec. 8

Work on proof and items for Tuesday's trial and
organizing files for quick recall.

Jl/>
7 hours

Dec. 10

Time in court including transportation of documents.

8 hours

Dec. 11

Time in court and meetings with attorney during breaks,

Dec. 12

Time in court.

8 hours
JA/O
8 hours

Jan. 8

Time in court including transportation of documents.

KVO
7 hours

Jan. 9

Time in court and meeting with attorney during breaks,

7 hours

J a n l 7 , 18

Time to go over records to work out time used in this
1awsui t.

1_1_ hours

Dec. 7

Dec. 9

1986

M3
M>

frO
160 I hour

&e#*
{pi

<y
u
u

WILLARD L. SMITH, CPA
Shceduie work done for William W. Bowerbank
for Western Auto Radiator Co. Lawsuit
January 16, 1986

Copy document for William W. Bowerbank
Copy documents for William W. Bowerbank
Time spent to hunt information on 1978 deposit
needed for his defense.

\/

WILLARD L. SMITH, CPA
Western Auto Radiator Co
Shcedule of Time not billed on Lawsuit
January 16, 1986

April 1984

Time spent with two CPA's from Mclntyre's office.

Oct. 1984

Prepare material for Burt Dart, Attorney

Feb. 1985

Meet with Attorney Dart on Corporate Stock issue

2 0 (paid)

June 1985

Rewrite action and meet with Attorney Dart

1.5 (paid)

Sept. 1985

Tax returns furnished to attorney

Sept. 1985

Charges for work on minute books, typing
photocopying and comparing copies of
minutes to make sure sets are complete.

>ept. 1985

6 (paid)

Oct. 1985

2.7 (paid)

Time working on minutes in order to have
three complete copies and to make sure
there were no duplications.

23.9 hrs.

ime already billed to corporation by
'secretaries

-2.7
21.2

Copying wouchers from files of Western
Auto Radiator Co. for lawsuit.

2..0

Talk to Blaine about management and company lawsuit.

1..5

Additional time on company minutes and final
preparations to make 3 complete copies

11 .0

Work on company by-laws to ma\e ready for
printing
Printing costs for binding company minutes
Oct. 30, 1985 Meeting with Heyrend and Maloy on a plan to
implement an offer from W. W. Bowerbank
Jan. 1986

(paid)

$6 40

Unbilled Amount
Sept. 1985

2.0 (paid)

Work on Western court issues

l-.u J?l>

.JO.?.T

'••51.

1 .0
$11.10

1.2 (paid
.5 (paid

Total unpaid hours

Printing costs not paid

$11 10

WILLARD L. SMITH, PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT

Employee Time Sheet
Month ''
Acct.

L.

Ac.Rec.
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WILLARD L. SMITH, PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
Employee Time Sheet
Month
Acct.

SL

Ac.Rec,
Cust.
Emp.

_
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WILLARD L. SMITH, PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
Employee Time Sheet

Month
Descr.
Code

fl

If

Hours

Hour
Rate

Other Services or Supplies
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UILLARD L. SMITH
KEITH C. SMITH
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
:LIENT
lATE '

W3410 WESTERN AUTO RADIATOR
10/31/85
INV*

908

IMPUTER PRINT OUT OF GENERAL LEDGER DETAIL* PROFIT X LOSS
ATEMENT* AND BALANCE SHEET.
51 PAGES (? 1*50 PAGE

76*50

iING CHART OF ACCTS* ACCTS RECEIVABLE REGISTER*
IARGES AND RECEIPTS REGISTER FOR ACCTS RECEIVABLE.
43 PAGES @ 2.00 PAGE

86.00

!INT OUT OF EMPLOYEE PAYROLL DATA.
32 PAGES @

2.00 PAGE

64.00

ICONCILEMENT OF BANK BALANCE TO GENERAL LEDGER
iLANCE AND VERIFY CHECKS, DEPOSITS AND BANK CHARGES.
2.00 HRS. 0 14.00 HR.

28.00

.ASSIFICATION OF CHECKS AS TO CAPITAL
PENDITURES* PAYMENT OF LIABILITIES* PAYROLL EXPENSE*
1ST OF GOODS SOLD, AND GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE.
1.35 HRS. (? 14.00 HR.

18.90

5EPARATI0N OF SALES LEDGERS.
REVIEW OF ACCOUNTS
ICEIVABLE BALANCESr RECONCILEMENT OF CASH GENERATED TO CASH
IPOSITED AND IDENTIFICATION OF CASH GENERATED OTHER THAN BY
tLES.
1 . 7 0 HRS. 6 1 4 . 0 0 HR.

23.80

IITE UP OF MATERIAL FOR GENERAL LEDGER INPUT.
ETCHING REVENUE TO EXPENSE. REVIEW TO INSURE THAT ALL
'EMS DURING THE PERIOD ARE PROPERLY RECORDED.
9.90 HRS. @ 14.00 HR.

138.60

IMPUTER TIME TO INPUT PAYROLL AND BALANCE
) CONTROL TOTALS.
5.50 HRS. (3 14.00 HR.

77.00

IMPUTER TIME TO INPUT GENERAL LEDGER AND
iLANCE TO CONTROL TOTALS.
5.50 HRS. @ 14.00 HR.

77.00

IPLOYEE TIME TO INPUT SALES TICKETS AND CASH
»YMENTS INTO COMPUTER FOR PROCESSING ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE
UNG LISTSt INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS REGISTER* AND
ID CHARGES AND RECEIPTS REGISTERS.
4.00 HRS. (? 14.00 HR.

56.00

JING CHART OF ACCTS* ACCTS RECEIVABLE REGISTER*

UILLARD L. SMITH
KEITH C, SMITH
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
CHARGES AND RECEIPTS REGISTER FOR ACCTS RECEIVABLE*
0,50 HRS. 0 14.00 HR.

7.00

PREPARATION OF ACCOUNTS PAYABLE CHARGES FOR COMPUTER
INPUT* CHECKING PAYMENTS* AND PROOFING BALANCES FROM PRIOR
TO CURRENT MONTH.
3.50 HRS* 0 14.00 HR.

49.00

PREPARATION OF FEDERAL TAX FORMS FOR PAYMENT OF FUTA
TAX* FICA TAX* AND FEDERAL WITHHOLDING TAX AND RECONCILEMENT
OF PAYROLL TAX DEPOSITS TO TAX RETURNS.
2.80 HRS. 0 14.00 HR.
PREPARATION OF UTAH WITHHOLDING TAX REPORTS* UTAH
UNEMP COMP TAX REPORT* AND UTAH SALES AND USE*TAX REPORT.
2.45 HRS. 0 14.00 HR.

39.20

34.30

PREPARATION OF WAGE DATA FOR COMPUTER INPUT
TO PRINT WAGE CHECKS AND FORMULATING CONTROLS TOTALS.
0.40 HRS. 0 14.00 HR.

5.60

ASSEMBLE STATEMENTS* REMOVE CARBON*
AND FILE MATERIAL IN PERMANENT RECORD FILE.
0.60 HRS. 0 14.00 HR.

8.40

CHECK INVOICES TO STATEMENTS AND
ASSEMBLE IN ENVELOPES FOR MAILING TO CUSTOMERS
1.40 HRS. 0 14.00 HR.

19.60

STORAGE 155 CUSTOMERS
15.50
43 PAYROLL CHECKS
4.27
TYPING
1.20 HRS. 0 14.00 HR.

16.80

4.00 HRS. 0 14.00 HR.

56.00

0.90 HRS. 0 14.00 HR.

12.60

0.90 HRS. 0 14.00 HR.

12.60

1099S FOR 1985
WORK ON BONUS CHECKS FOR QTR
RUN GEN LEDGER COPIES TO MAIL BOARD
POSTAGE
8.58

WILLARD L. SMITH
KEITH C. SMITH
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
'R POSTAGE
25.74
EVIEW CAR PURCHASE WITH BLAINE
2.00 HRS. @ 14,00 HR.

28.00

1*20 HRS. 0 14.00 HR.

16.80

EVIEW OF INVOICES AND VOUCHERS
DPIES OF GENERAL LEDGER
2.80
GRAND TOTAL

1008.59

STATEMENT
,

W , L . & K , C . SMITH CO, C P A ' S
1 3 3 0 S O , 11TH EAST S T ,
SftLT LRKE C I T Y , UT
84105
(801)486-5331
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W.L. & K,C, SMITH CO, CPA'

0790

WESTERN AUTO RADIATOR CO.
Manufacture, Rebuild, Clean
and-Repair All Radiators
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SALT-LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
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ADDENDUM C

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann., § 16-10-4(o) (1953)
16-10-4(o) (1)
A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who was or is a party or is threatened to be made
a party to any threatened, pending or completed action, suit or
proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative or investigative (other than an action by or in the right of the corporation) by reason of the fact that he is or was a director,
officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was
serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership,
joint venture, trust or other enterprise, against expenses
(including attorney's fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid
in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by him in
connection with such action, suit or proceeding if he acted in
good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or
not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and, with
respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable
cause to believe his conduct was unlawful. The termination of
any action, suit or proceeding by judgment, order, settlement,
conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent,
shall not, of itself, create a presumption that the person did
not act in good faith and in a manner which he reasonably
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation, and with respect to any criminal action or
proceeding, had reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was
unlawful.
(2) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person
who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any
threatened, pending or completed action or suit by or in the
right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor by
reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer,
employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at
the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee
or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture,
trust or other enterprise against expenses (including attorney's
fees) actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection with
the defense or settlement of such action or suit if he acted in
good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or
not opposed to the best interests of the corporation and except
that no indemnification shall be made in respect of any claim,
issue or matter as to which such person shall have been adjudged
to be liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of
his duty to the corporation unless and only to the extent that
the court in which such action or suit was brought shall
determine upon application that, despite the adjudication of
liability but in view of all circumstances of the case, such
person is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity for such
expenses which such court shall deem proper.
(3) To the extent that a director, officer, employee or
agent of a corporation has been successful on the merits or
otherwise in defense of any action, suit or proceeding referred

to in (1) or (2) of this subsection, or in defense of any claim,
issue or matter thereinf he shall be indemnified against
expenses (including attorney's fees) actually and reasonably
incurred by him in connection therewith.
(4) Any indemnification under (1) or (2) of this subsection (unless ordered by a court) shall be made by the corporation only as authorized in the specific case upon a determination that indemnification of the director, officer, employee or
agent is proper in the circumstances because he has met the
applicable standard of conduct set forth in (1) or (2) of this
subsection.
Such determination shall be made by the board of
directors by a majority vote of a quorum of the directors, or by
the shareholders.
(5) Expenses incurred in defending a civil or criminal
action, suit or proceeding may be paid by the corporation in
advance of the final disposition of such action, suit or
proceeding as authorized in the manner provided in (4) of this
subsection upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of the
director, officer, employee or agent to repay such amount unless
it shall ultimately be determined that he is entitled to be
indemnified by the corporation as authorized in this section.
(6) The indemnification provided by this subsection shall
not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those
indemnified may be entitled under any bylaw, agreement, vote of
shareholders or disinterested directors or otherwise, both as to
action in his official capacity and as to action in another
capacity while holding such office and shall continue as to a
person who has ceased to be a director, officer, employee or
agent and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors and
administrators of such a person.
(7) A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of any person who is or was a director,
officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was
serving at the request of the corporation as a director,
officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership,
joint venture, trust or other enterprise against any liability
asserted against him and incurred by him in any such capacity or
arising out of his status as such, whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify him against such liability under the provisions of this subsection.

